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This paper shows that managers fail to readjust their capital structure in response to external stock
returns.  Thus, the typical firm's capital structure is not caused by attempts to time the market, by attempts
to minimize taxes or bankruptcy costs, or by any other attempts at firm-value maximization.  Instead,
capital structure is almost entirely determined by lagged stock returns (which, when applied to ancient
equity values, predict current equity value and with it debt equity ratios). Consequently, one should
conclude that capital structure is determined primarily by external stock market influences, and not by
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ivo.welch@yale.eduColumbus’ Egg is a myth in many non-English languages. Supposedly, at a
dinner banquet in honor of Columbus’ discovery of the Americas, some guests
claimed that anyone could have discovered a continent as big as the New World.
In response, Columbus challenged them to balance an egg on the table. Every-
one tried and failed. Columbus then cracked the egg on one side, so that it
would easily stand. The point of this anecdote is to describe how diﬃcult the
obvious can be before it is pointed out.
I Introduction
Inertia is often a diﬃcult phenomenon for empiricists to measure. Observing the
same behavior as in the past can simply be due to the fact that the same behavior
that was optimal in the past continues to be optimal in the future. Thus, to test a
theory of inertia, it is important to identify a situation in which the empiricist can
measure the underlying causes that should cause an optimizer to change course.
Capital structure, that is a ﬁrm’s choice of ﬁnancing between debt and equity, is
a good candidate for testing inertia. Not only is there good data on ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing
structure and well established theories to give guidance on optimal active ﬁrm be-
havior (Harris and Raviv (1991)), but if the ﬁrm does not respond by readjusting its
capital structure, its capital structure will be whipsawed by external market forces.
Moreover, the whipsaw eﬀect is opposite of that suggested by most economic
theories of ﬁrm value maximization. Firms which experience positive shocks to
their enterprise values should take on higher, not lower debt/equity ratios: ce-
teris paribus, ﬁrms being worth more are less likely to go bankrupt and thus have
lower expected bankruptcy costs. Weighing these lower expected bankruptcy costs
against any preexisting beneﬁts of debt (e.g., from the tax shield), this increase in
enterprise value by itself should be suﬃcient to imply that the ﬁrm should readjust,
i.e., issue more debt in order to retain at least as high a debt/equity ratio as it had
before.1
1“Opportunistic” managerial behavior may be an exception. Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue
that ﬁrms may issue more equity when share prices increase. However, our results will show that
opportunistic behavior is not a major determinant, either.
2In contrast, an inert ﬁrm which does not respond to positive stock returns—
which causes an increase in its public market equity value—will mechanistically
ﬁnd itself with a lower debt/equity ratio. Unlike many other behavioral ﬁnance hy-
potheses (but not all; see Benartzi and Thaler (2001)), the inertia hypothesis has a
speciﬁc quantitative prediction on the debt ratio: the inert ﬁrm’s debt-equity ratio
would change exactly according to the equity value change implied by its histori-
cal stock returns. This speciﬁcity of the behavioral alternative allows our paper to
both qualify and quantify the relative importance of inertia vs. a tax-bankruptcy
value optimization. Our paper is rather diﬀerent from much other related economic
research, in that our deﬁnition of the inert capital structure ratio allows us to fo-
cus primarily on the quantitative instead of the qualitative dimension of the capital
structure choice problem.
We ﬁnd that ﬁrms experiencing increases in market value show no movement to
return towards their original debt ratio. Instead, ﬁrms’ capital structure is practi-
cally perfectly in line with that mechanistically induced by their stock returns. The
eﬀect is long-lasting, at least 4 to 5 years. We can thus conclude that inertia is the
primary character of managerial behavior. In turn, this means that capital structure
is primarily determined exogenously by raw stock returns—and not by one of the
many favorite information and tax theories proposed by ﬁnancial economists, such
as managerial optimization with respect to tax rates, bankruptcy costs, earnings,
proﬁtability, or even market timing and the exploitation of undervaluation. These
theories stand up well in terms of normative value, but they have at best only minor
positive descriptive ability.
Our paper intends not to take a stance on whether inertia itself is the outcome
of an agency problem, a memory problem (e.g., Hirshleifer and Welch (2002)), an
inﬂuence problem (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (2000)), ﬁnancial transaction costs and
markets frictions (e.g., Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), Leland (1994)), or a
near-rational or irrational behavior pattern (e.g., Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988),
Benartzi and Thaler (2001)). Thus, we leave the inertia hypothesis under the general
rubric of “behavioral ﬁnance,” which can cover both rational and irrational behav-
ior. For simplicity, we shall just name the two contrasting hypotheses “optimizing”
3(perhaps, better, “readjusting”) and “inert” behavior, respectively; even if there is a
sense in which inert behavior is likely to be itself the result of some optimization,
be it of ﬁrm value or managerial utility.
Transaction costs deserve a special mention, though. In particular, it is plausible
that it is expensive for ﬁrms to issue equity to reduce their debt ratio in response to
falling enterprise valuation. However, a debt ratio can also be reduced by selling oﬀ
assets to pay oﬀ debt or by using former dividends to repurchase debt.2 More im-
portantly, we ﬁnd inert behavior also when ﬁrms’ values increase, and issuing more
debt to repurchase equity is unlikely to incur dramatic transaction costs. Never-
theless, as just mentioned, one can relabel inertia to be equivalent to some form of
transaction costs, be they real or imaginary. Although Titman (2001) agrees with
practitioners that the direct ﬁnancial capital structure rearrangement transaction
costs are small in the United States, simple back-of-the-envelope-calculations (in
Section III.B) point out that this may or may not be the case.
Our personal view is that the evidence is consistent with some (avoidable) trans-
action costs, plus a dual perspective: First, managers may not want to repurchase
equity to issue more debt when their equity value has recently increased, be it be-
cause they fail to recognize the potential beneﬁts of debt, be it because they feel
their equity is now overvalued, or be it that they are now harder to dislodge.3 Sec-
ond, managers may want to issue more equity to retire debt when the ﬁrm falls on
hard times, i.e., when their equity value has dropped. It may be at precisely these
times that they feel that their equity is undervalued and thus that issuing more
equity is not in their interest.
In sum, corporate theorists may want to take a more dynamic perspective. In
particular, there should be more focus on the sources and roles of frictions. But this
dynamic perspective, if it is to accurately describe ﬁrms’ capital structure policies,
will only be able to point out the obvious: non-action by managers. Editorializ-
2Because equity values have already fallen signiﬁcantly, this again should lead to an increase
in enterprise value, not a decrease. Thus, absent frictions, a debt-equity swap (e.g., with existing
creditors) is now optimal to avoid bankruptcy costs.
3Zwiebel (1995) explicitly considers capital structure, arguing that positive value shocks en-
trench managers. This means that they have the ability to avoid fully rebalancing with its disci-
plinary implications.
4ing even further, if contracting (not transaction!) costs are modest (Schwartz and
Watson (2000)), the natural solution to improving ﬁrms’ capital structure would be
for them to issue securities that convert into debt as their values increase and into
equity as their values decrease—the opposite of convertible securities.
Our paper now proceeds as follows: Section II ﬁrst belabors the use of book val-
ues instead of market values, if only to deﬂect the criticism that our market-based
measure has been chosen to suit our purpose. Thus, this section points out why
the book value of equity is a problematic estimate for the equity of a ﬁrm. Our pa-
per, like most economic theories, relies speciﬁcally on the market-value of equity,
not on the book market value of equity. The same section then deﬁnes our vari-
ables. Section III shows our main result in simple classiﬁcation tables: past stock
returns seem to be the primary determinants of observed market-based debt ratios.
Section IV uses regressions to decompose capital structure into inertia and readjust-
ment (towards the prior capital structure). Consequently, any readjustment, even
if only to the original level, is fully attributed to optimization. This section also
explores the longevity of the inﬂuence of past equity movements before managers
begin to take readjustment actions. Even over a 5-year horizon, we ﬁnd barely
any evidence that managers counteract the inﬂuence of stock returns. Section V
adds some other variables popular in the literature to our regressions, such as tax
rates, uniqueness, growth opportunities, and proﬁtability. It also introduces herd-
ing towards industry ratios. The three most important non-inertia components are
industry herding, stock return volatility, and tax rates, even though all three are
dwarfed in importance by simple inertia. If nothing else, our study shows that
the variables prominently featured in some other studies as explanators of capital
structures—speciﬁcally uniqueness measures, proﬁtability ratios, and book/market
values—seem to function only through their mechanistic correlation with (past) re-
turns and equity capitalization. Once we include our mechanistic inertia debt ratio,
these variables lose their power. Section VI puts our results into the context of the
literature. Section VII concludes.
5II Data
There is only one proper measurement of value, and this value is market-value—not
book value. We are not aware of any economic theory of ﬁrm-maximization that
applies to book value rather than market value.
This paper predicts the debt ratio, deﬁned as the level of long-term debt plus
debt in current liabilities (in short, “debt”), divided by the sum of the level of debt
and the market level of equity. Our results hold if we choose the level of equity
as the numerator (which is just one minus our measure), or even if we predict the
equity level divided by accounting assets. The important aspect is that we use the
market-value of equity, not its book-value. Because a number of papers have used
the book value of equity—often with contradictory conclusions—it is important to
ﬁrst describe in detail why the book value is not a great variable—if only to defend
ourselvesagainsttheaccusationofhavingcherry-picked ouruseofthemarket-value
of equity as our measure.
A Equity Book Value vs. Equity Market Value
In plainest terms, the book value of equity is a “plug” number used to balance the
right-hand and left-hand sides of the balance sheet. As such, it has little economic
signiﬁcance in itself. It is the result of numerous accounting rules that have little to
do with true economic value and all to do with rote computations based on lagged
accounting variables.
Book Equity = Retained Earnings + Capital Surplus
+ Common Stock + Treasury Stock
Dividing both sides by the book value of equity, a variance decomposition reveals
that changes in retained earnings (overwhelmingly changes in earnings themselves)
are more important than changes in the capital surplus (overwhelmingly changes
in active capital structure policy). About half of the book value of equity that some
papers have tried to explain is simply past proﬁtability, the other half is past ac-
counting adjustments, mostly but not exclusively reﬂecting active issuing activity.
6A variance decomposition of total accounting assets (the denominator in the
commonly used debt/asset ratio used in some papers) shows that the book value
of equity is its most important component (which, as just pointed out, is at least
half past earnings). Long-term debt is about one-ﬁfth as important, followed by
other components. (This makes sense if debt policy is constant, because one would
not expect debt to have as drastic swings in value as equity.) In sum, explaining
changes in the ratio of book value of debt over total assets predicts multiple factors,
including changes in earnings.
Insert Table 1 Here:
Selected Firms: Equity Book and Market Values and Total Book Assets
It is worthwhile to point out some of the non-sensical values that a book-value
of equity can take. Table 1 displays the book value of equity, market value of
equity, and book value of assets for selected ﬁrms. For example, Sky Broadcasting
appeared on the Compustat tapes in 1995 with a book value of equity of negative
1.2 billion dollars, even though its market cap was 495 million dollars. Caremark
dropped in value in 1998, but even in 2000, its book value of equity continues to
be negative while its market capitalization has increased back to 3 billion dollars.
Cablevision has yet to obtain a positive book value of equity, despite having a market
capitalization of over 11 billion dollars in 2000. The table also shows that increases
in market value are not equivalent to increases in book value.
A researcher using book-equity based ratios could ﬁnd that some ﬁrms have
negative debt-equity ratios. Naturally, when a ratio denominator can be negative, it
can also sometimes take values small enough to blow up the ratio. These problems
can make such ﬁrms potentially inﬂuential observations in any regression.
Insert Table 2 Here:
Correlations: Book Values of Equity vs. Market Values of Equity
In Table 2, we compute correlations among equity book values, equity market
values, and debt. The variables are normalized by assets—unfortunately, we cannot
7compute correlations between percentage changes of book values and market val-
ues, because 2.6% of small ﬁrms have negative equity values (1.2% for large ﬁrms).
We also include tiny ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁrms which one year prior had a market capital-
ization in million dollars that was less than the level of the S&P500, divided by 10),
even though these ﬁrms are deliberately excluded from our study later (see Page 12).
These ﬁrms may have been included in other studies.
Table 2 shows that the (asset-adjusted) market value of equity has only mild
correlation with the (asset-adjusted) book value of equity. However, as (lagged)
ﬁrm size increases, this correlation increases (naturally, partially caused by the
persistence of value and the selection rule itself). Appendix Ashows that a debt ratio
based on the book-value of equity is even incapable of explaining a simultaneous
debt ratio based on the market-value of equity. Equally of concern is the fact that
debt ratios correlate much better with book values than with market values. In
addition, a researcher tracking the inﬂuence of equity values using book rather than
market values faces another systematic problem: when ﬁrms grow, it is conceivable
that changes in the meaning of the variables can themselves become important (as
Table 2), in addition to the sought-after changes in ﬁrms’ capital structure policies.
There are some things that can be said in favor of the book value of equity:
First, when it is used as a lagged predictor, e.g., in forecasts of future stock returns
using lagged Q-ratios or book/market ratios (as in Fama and French (1992); see
also Weaver and Weston (2001)), the book value is as valid as any other known
variable. In this context, its use is reasonable, even if it is not entirely clear what it
really means, and how it is distorted in cross-section. Second, as Shyam-Sunder and
Myers (1999) point out, the market value of equity reﬂects both current business
value and growth options. If, and this is a big if, the book value of equity reﬂects
current business value, then the book value of equity might have better reﬂected the
borrowing ability of businesses, especially in the past. If the concern is that book
values are more reﬂective of potential tax deductions, perhaps a better approach
would be to focus only on ﬁrms that have a book value at least as high as their
market value. This approach may oﬀer the best of both worlds: the ﬁrm value may
be less due to not-yet-realized growth options, but the ﬁrm value itself (and changes
8therein) would be measured accurately. In Table 11, we ﬁnd no evidence for our
study that ﬁrms with high book values (and those proﬁtable enough to use the tax
deduction of interest immediately) react any diﬀerently. Third, perhaps managers
know something that markets do not. Thus, book values could be more permanent
predictors of market value than market value. Aside from the obvious eﬃcient
markets problem, we ﬁnd in Table 8 that managers show no diﬀerence in inertia
when they experience subsequent stock return reversals than when they experience
subsequent stock return continuation. Stock prices are ﬁrst and foremost random
walks, and not mean-reverting. In any case, capital structure shows no predictive
ability of future equity value reversals.
B The Data and Variables





where Dt is the book value of debt, deﬁned as the sum of long-term debt and debt
in current liabilities (Compustat items [9]+[34]), and Et is the market value of equity
(computed from CRSP as the number of outstanding shares times price). (In Table 9,
we explore other debt deﬁnitions, using also accounts payables [70] and convertible
securities [79].) ADRt is our dependent variable.
Deﬁne the inert debt ratio that will result if the ﬁrm does nothing, i.e., neither
issues nor retires debt or equity, as
IDRt 1;t 
Dt 1
Dt 1  Et 1  1  Rt 1;t
; (2)
where Dt 1 and Et 1 are as deﬁned above, and Rt 1;t is the external stock return
experienced by the ﬁrm’s equity from t 1 to t, as obtained from CRSP. (Prices were
cross-checked with those reported by Compustat item [199].) Note that our market
value at time t   1 grossed up by the stock market return from t   1 to t can be
diﬀerent from the market value of equity at time t. The diﬀerences are dividend
9payments, share repurchases and equity issuing activity. For example, if the ﬁrm
pays dividends, the IDR variable will be based on a higher imputed equity value
(lower debt ratio) than on its actual equity value (higher debt ratio). By design, IDR
moves mechanistically with equity (enterprise) value changes, and not with manage-
rial capital structure choices. Even though IDR relies on lagged capital structure,
the stock return causes IDR’s subscript to read from t   1 to t.
Our deﬁnition of IDR has the shortcoming that it ignores that the market and
book values of debt are also diﬀerent, but cross-sectionally heterogeneous changes
in debt value are much smaller than cross-sectionally heterogeneous changes in
equity values. Thus, they are likely to be minor in a cross-sectional study (see also
Bowman (1980)).
Our tests basically boil down to asking the question of whether ADR1 (timed at
t  1) is better predicted by its own lagged value ADR0, or whether it is better pre-
dicted by IDR0;1. Under the NULL hypothesis of optimizing—or at least deliberate—
behavior, lagged ADR should reﬂect a target that managers wish to achieve and thus
wish to readjust to.
Finally, we also entertain additional variables, some suggested by the existing
literature:
Uniqueness Titman and Wessels (1988) ﬁnds that measures of uniqueness help
explain capital structure. We follow their deﬁnitions:
• RD0/SLS0: The ratio of R&D [46] as a function of sales [12]. When missing,
in relevant regressions, the ﬁrm-year is ignored.
• SLEXP0/SLS0: Selling expense [189] divided by sales [12].
Taxes The tax-bankruptcy tradeoﬀ is perhaps the deﬁning tradeoﬀ of normative
capital structure theory. We explore the role of
• TAXRATE
G
0: The tax rate, kindly provided by John Graham and used in
his papers described below in more detail. (The “B” version is based on
income before interest expense [as in Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim
10(1998), and predicts better]; the “A” version is based on income after
interest expense).
• TAX0/(EARN0+TAX0): A more naive tax-rate, deﬁned as total income taxes
[16](or[317]), dividedbyearningsplustotalincometaxes([53][54]+[16]).
This variable is truncated to lie within –1 and +2 in order to reduce the
inﬂuence of some extreme observations.
• TAX0/TA0: Taxes paid, deﬁned as income taxes [16] (or [317]), divided by
total assets [6].
Proﬁtability and Growth Proﬁtability and growth have been a variable of some im-
portance in the empirical literature (e.g., Titman and Wessels (1988)). The
most common deﬁnitions are
• OI0/SLS0, the ratio of operating income [13] divided by sales [12]
• OI0/TA0, the ratio of operating income [13] divided by total assets [6]
• BVE0/MVE0, theratioofthebookvalueofequity[60]dividedbythemarket
valueofequity(wherebookvalueisusedasaalaggedandthusadmissible
predictor), is often used as a measure of growth opportunities.
We also tried some other deﬁnitions, not reported in the tables, but described
in the text.
Firm and Equity Volatility Firm volatility (FVOL 1;0) and equity volatility (EVOL 1;0)
are computed as the simple standard deviation of log-returns over the 12
months preceding the measurement period, using CRSP data. Firm volatility is
computed by adjusting equity volatility with end-of-period capital structure.
Industry Herding Perhaps, managers are inclined to adjust towards their own in-
dustry ratio (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998) provide an overview
over some of the voluminous herding literature). Thus, we compute average
debt ratios in year 0, either over 2-digit SIC industries or over 3-digit SIC in-
dustries. (The industry includes the ﬁrm itself.) Our variable is the diﬀerence




11We sometimes report NR0;1, the S&P index adjusted return; and %V0;1, the per-
cent change in the total value of the ﬁrm (the sum of debt and the market value of
equity).
Finally, we exclude ﬁrm-years in which one year prior to their use the ﬁrm did not
have at least a market equity capitalization of the level of the S&P500 divided by 10.
In other words, to be included in year 2000 statistics, a ﬁrm with a December ﬁscal
year end would have had to have a market capitalization of at least $146.9 million
in December 1999 (the S&P500 index ﬁnished 1999 at 1,469.25). This selection rule
is introduced to avoid the concern that tiny ﬁrms are driving the results.
C Descriptive Statistics
Our data is from the period 1975 to 2000, which is determined by the availability of
Compustat data. All variables are measured in percent, unless otherwise indicated.
Insert Table 3 Here:
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this paper.
Firms typically have debt ratios of about 25% to 30%.4 Adding accounts payables
increases this ﬁgure by another 10%. Firms earn about 4% to 5% on assets after
depreciation, 12% before depreciation. They averaged about 3.7 times the size of
the S&P500 level, i.e., about $4 billion in market cap in recent years. However, the
median market cap is signiﬁcantly smaller. Similarly, the ﬁrms’ accounting assets
averaged $4 billion, but only $400 million in median. 25% of our ﬁrm-years have
debt ratings, and of these, two-thirds are not of investment grade quality. Firms had
an average tax rate of 30-35%, and paid about 2.5 to 3.3% of their assets to Uncle
Sam.
4The –18.9% reported for “long-term debt only” is not our mistake, but most likely a Compustat
error. It does not aﬀect our results.
12The uniqueness measures are problematic. They have means that are unreason-
ably high for all but tech ﬁrms. Mean R&D is 85.2% of sales,5 but median R&D is only
2.1%. Selling expenses are a bit more reasonable, with similar means and medians,
but huge outliers at the upper end.
Firms in our sample increased in enterprise value (sum of debt and equity), either
through good performance or by raising capital, by about 10% to 20% per year. Raw
returns were about 11% to 17% per year, and about –1.6% to 3.6% after subtracting
the S&P500 index percent change.
In terms of means, the market value represents about 1.2 times ﬁrms’ total ac-
counting assets, the book value of equity only about 0.4 times. However, in medians,
the diﬀerence is less pronounced, because book values have fewer outliers. Debt
represents about 20% of ﬁrms’ assets.
III Simple Evidence
A Bivariate Tables
Insert Table 4 Here:
Categorized Average Value Change, Actual and Implied Debt Ratios, and Returns
The main research question of this paper is whether IDR0;1 or ADR0 is a better
predictor of ADR1, i.e., whether variations in debt ratios are caused primarily by
external stock returns, or by intentional managerial choices to readjust to their old
target ratio (or, preferably, to “over-rebalance” it to reach the new tradeoﬀ opti-
mum).
Table 4 categorizes all ﬁrm-years into deciles based on net returns NR0;1 in
Panel A; lagged debt ratio ADR0 in Panel B; implied debt ratio IDR0;1 (computed
from lagged capital structure and raw stock returns over the year) in Panel C; and
5The mean is obviously driven by outliers. We have repeated our study with ﬁrms worth more
than the S&P (i.e., imposing a minimum market cap constraint of $1 billion), which eliminates the
outliers and provides a reasonable mean. The results reported later (i.e., that R&D has no marginal
inﬂuence) remain.
13current debt ratio ADR1 (the variable to be predicted in this study). Each panel dis-
plays ADR0, ADR1, IDR0;1, and a set of variables measuring ﬁrm size change and
stock performance over the year (from 0 to 1).
All panels show that implied debt ratio IDR0;1 lines up better with future debt ra-
tio ADR1 than does the lagged debt ratio ADR0. This shows up strongest in Panel A—
which gives the best spread of returns (i.e., discrepancy between IDR0;1 and ADR0)—
and in Panel D—which gives the best spread in the variable to be predicted. Spread-
ing either by ADR0 in Panel B or by IDR0;1 in Panel C does not oﬀer as much power,
simply because these panels lump ﬁrm-years into the same categories too often.
There is some mild evidence that ﬁrms that experience good times are more
likely to show a capital structure even more equity-heavy than implied by their
returns: if they actively adjust capital structure, they do not do so to rebalance it to
return to their earlier ratio or to adopt a higher leverage ratio. Instead, they seem to
move further away from their past leverage ratio (Baker and Wurgler (2002)). Firms
that experience bad times do show some rebalancing tendency. At least, when they
do adjust, they do so to nudge towards their earlier ratios. But ﬁrst and foremost,
ﬁrms just do not adjust.
Insert Table 5 Here:
Value Change, Actual and Implied Debt Ratios, and Returns By Net Return:
Equal Number of Firms per Year, December Firms Only, and Medians
Table 5 implements some robustness checks on the equivalent tabulation of
Panel A in Table 4 (i.e., sorted by net returns NR0;1). In Panel A, we sort an equal num-
ber of ﬁrms from each year into each decile bin. In Panel B, we use only ﬁrms with
a ﬁscal year ending in December, thus avoiding some returns overlap. In Panel C,
we report medians instead of means within each cell.
Allpanelssupportourbasicassertion: ﬁrms’capitalstructureseemstobedriven
more by external stock returns than by a conscious return to a prior capital structure
(and certainly not by an intention to increase leverage as the ﬁrm grows).
14B The Transaction Cost Interpretation Revisited
First, note that even for large changes in capital structure, ﬁrms do very little read-
justment. This indicates that inventory-type models (under which one should ob-
serve more readjustment for larger deviations from the optimum) are not likely to
be of signiﬁcant explanatory power.
We perform some rough conservative back-of-the-envelope computations to see
if ﬁnancial transaction costs can account for the inertia. The median ﬁrm in our
sample had a market capitalization of about $500 million and a debt-ratio of about
25% (i.e., about $165 million in debt for $500 million in equity). Let us presume that
such a ﬁrm experienced raw returns such that its debt-ratio changed by 5%. Holding
market cap constant, this implies that its debt capitalization changed by about $40
million. If the ﬁrm paid as low an interest rate as 6% on its debt, interest would
come to roughly $2.5 million over one year. At the median tax rate of about 30%,
the adjustment represents a tax saving of $750,000 in the ﬁrst year, $12 million if
it were a perpetuity. The ﬁrst year tax savings represent about 1.8% of the market
capitalization of the debt. This is higher than the transaction costs for short-term
debt. Still, it is legitimate to take the view that direct ﬁnancial transaction costs
help explain the short-term inertia of corporations, especially those only moderately
aﬀected by their equity returns. Financial transaction costs are less likely to explain
multi-year correction failure, especially among ﬁrms experiencing extreme stock
returns.
Our paper considers inertia to be the outcome of many potential factors, ranging
the spectrum from rational transaction cost to behavioral irrationality (making it
cognitivelyexpensivetoreact). Itisthesetransactioncostswhichmaketheobserved
corporate capital structure reﬂective primarily of outside stock returns, and less so
of an inside bankruptcy costs vs. tax costs tradeoﬀ.
15IV Decomposing Inﬂuences Using Regressions
A Method
We can use regressions to decompose ﬁrms’ behavior into “readjustment behav-
ior” (the return to the previous debt ratio) and inert behavior. The test centers on
the question of whether IDRt 1;t oﬀers marginal explanatory power in a regression
predicting ADRt
ADRt  0  1  ADRt 1  2  IDRt 1;t  t : (3)
The hypotheses are
Readjustment Hypothesis: 1  1 ; 2  0 (4)
Perfect Inertia Hypothesis: 1  0 ; 2  1 (5)
Naturally, ﬁrms could also adopt a convex combination strategy.
All regressions are ordinary least squares. Most (or all) of the explanatory power
derives from the cross-section of ﬁrms, not the time-series of years. When we report
“F-M” numbers, we mean the yearly averages of cross-sectional statistics. When we
report “pooled” numbers, we simply lump all ﬁrms into one large regression.
All standard errors are White-Hansen heteroskedasticity adjusted. The F-M num-
bers report just yearly averages, even over the standard errors, which are thus most
likely overstated by a factor of 5 (because they are averages over 25 years). The
reason is that we have so many observations that the economic signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcients is our ﬁrst concern, not the statistical signiﬁcance. The residuals in our
regressions have a nice bell shape, and seem generally well behaved.
Because most of the power comes from the cross-section, we do not need to be
concerned about unit roots. If the regressions set the coeﬃcient on ADR0 to be equal
to 1, it would mean that ﬁrms that had a high or low debt ratio in cross-section (i.e.,
relative) would continue to have a high or low ratio in cross-section the following
16year. Moreover, if the regression sets the 1 coeﬃcient to 1, our regressions can
be interpreted to be similar to change regressions, as reported, e.g., in Baker and
Wurgler (2002).
B The Base Regressions: Are Firms Rebalancing or Inert?
Insert Table 6 Here:
Year By Year Base Regressions
Table 6 reports the results of annual cross-sectional regressions based on Com-
pustat year classiﬁcations (a year is deﬁned from the ﬁscal year reporting date.
Thus, a year begins in July and ends in June of the following year). In addition, the
table reports the averages of the cross-sectional statistics (loosely called F-M) and
the results of a pooled regression in which each ﬁrm-year is one observation.
Table 6 shows that ﬁrms’ capital structure is primarily determined by the raw
stock return they experience, not by a return to a previous debt ratio. The coeﬃcient
on IDR0;1 is close to 1 (100%). In contrast, ﬁrms show no tendency to counterbalance
market movements in order to return to their prior debt ratio. The coeﬃcient on
ADR0 is practically zero. (Even if it is statistically signiﬁcantly negative, it is eco-
nomically close to zero). The constant indicates that all ﬁrms showed a marginal
increase in debt ratios over the sample period. (Variables were not demeaned!) In
order to avoid any overlap in the stock returns, Panel B reports just the overall F-M
and Pooled statistics when we use only ﬁrms with December ﬁscal year ends. The
results are basically the same.
17C Are Some Firms More Inclined To Rebalance?
Insert Table 7 Here:
Pooled Regressions Categorized By Third Variables
A reasonable question is whether ﬁrms tend not to return to their previous (pre-
sumably then optimal) capital structure because they do not need to: maybe they do
not pay attention, because they are too large too fail, or they are too proﬁtable to pay
attention, or their tax rate is not high enough to reduce taxes, or their bankruptcy
risk is too low to be meaningfully inﬂuenced by value changes.
Table 7 shows that there is some mild evidence that smaller and more unprof-
itable ﬁrms are less inert than larger and medium proﬁtable ﬁrms. However, neither
a high tax rate, nor the credit rating (bankruptcy risk), the two primary variables
used in the theoretical literature, show much inﬂuence. If anything, it is low-tax
ﬁrms which are more inclined to readjust their capital structure towards prior lev-
els. One word of caution: “more inclined” is still not “very inclined.” The IDR0;1
coeﬃcient is always above 90%, the ADR0 coeﬃcient is never above 5%. The book
or value characteristic of the ﬁrm similarly does not matter.
The last two panels of the table consider the role of ﬁrm volatility and equity
volatility. Because there is such a high correlation between ﬁrm size and volatility,
ﬁrms are ﬁrst sorted into quintiles based on total assets, and then sorted (within
each group of ﬁve similar-sized ﬁrms) into the ﬁve volatility bins. This keeps ﬁrm-
size constant, and still retains a spread across volatility quintiles. There is some
mild evidence that ﬁrms that are more volatile are also more inert. However, the
eﬀect is miniscule. Even the least volatile ﬁrms have coeﬃcients of about 95%—and
practically no tendency to revert.
18D Do Managers Fail To React Because They Know Something?
Perhaps managers do not target the market-based debt ratio because they believe
that market values are transitory. If this is the case, and managers have inside
information (so that this belief is justiﬁed), we would expect managers to be more
eager to embrace capital structure change if the value change later turns out to be
permanent. Thus, in the only classiﬁcation using ex-post variables, Table 8 classiﬁes
ﬁrms into a 5 by 5 grid based on current stock returns (used to compute IDR0;1) and
future stock returns. Firms in the left top and right bottom corners are those that
experience further changes in the same direction, and would thus beneﬁt even more
from a proactive capital structure policy. Firms in the right top and left bottom
corners are those that experience return reversals, and would thus least beneﬁt
from a more proactive capital structure policy.
Insert Table 8 Here:
By Current and Future Net Returns
Table 8 shows that ﬁrms experiencing reversals behave similarly to ﬁrms experi-
encing continuations. In the F-M regressions, there is some mild evidence that ﬁrms
that dropped for one year and then recovered display slightly lower inertia (contrary
to what would be the case if managers had expected the reversal). Firms that expe-
rience extreme returns with continuation thereof in the following year show almost
100% inertia. In the Pooled regressions, the ﬁrms that improved for one year and
then deteriorated displayed slightly higher inertia, but both ﬁrms that experience
extreme return continuations have higher inertia than ﬁrms that ﬁrst experience
high return and then low returns.
In any case, there is no dramatic diﬀerence among ﬁrms insofar as inertia is
concerned: if managers fail to act because they believe their stock market returns
to be transitory, the rationality of this belief is not borne out by the data.
19E Does the Form of Debt Matter?
Insert Table 9 Here:
Alternative Debt Deﬁnitions
Another interesting question is whether the form of debt matters. After all, we
failed to have access to changes in the value of the underlying debt. It was comfort-
ing to know that even investment-grade, large ﬁrms (i.e., those ﬁrms which should
show practically no cross-sectional change in the value of their debt in response to
changes in the value of their equity) have similar coeﬃcients.
We also know that convertible debt is more like equity. Thus, we would be
further comforted if our method determined a lower IDR0;1 coeﬃcient and higher
ADR0 coeﬃcient when we determine a debt ratio based solely on convertible debt.
Indeed, Table 9 supports this conjecture. Interestingly, ﬁrms do not even seem to
adjust their short-term debt ratios in response to changes in their equity value, i.e.,
where one would expect debt changes to be easiest. Finally, the expansion of debt
to include accounts payables (a major source of variability in ﬁrms’ year to year
borrowing) also makes no diﬀerence.
F How Long-lasting is Inertia?
In this subsection, we redeﬁne our variables IDR and ADR to be based on capital
structure more than just one year ago. Necessarily, IDR is thus relying not on 1-year







Dt a  Et a  1  Rt a;t
: (7)
This allows us to investigate how persistent the inﬂuence of external market returns
is, or whether ﬁrms eventually readjust in order to return to their former capital
structure.
20Insert Table 10 Here:
The Longevity of Inertia
/ And the External Determination of Capital Structure
Table 10 shows that ADR begins to show a positive coeﬃcient after about ﬁve
years. That is, ﬁrms ﬁnally begin to show some tendency to try to nudge back
towards their past debt ratios. Still, despite a decline in its coeﬃcient (and the
R2 of the regression), IDR remains the dominant variable. Even after ﬁve years, a
time span during which the average equity size more than doubled, we can still
explain a remarkable 65% of the capital structure variation across ﬁrms! Finally,
after ten years, and an average quadrupling in equity value, and after the number
of observations has notably dropped oﬀ, the coeﬃcient on IDR drops, albeit to a
respectable 50%. Both the intercept and the coeﬃcient on ADR (about half of the
IDR coeﬃcient) are beginning to play an important role. Thus, ﬁrms wish to re-
obtain some debt after their market capitalization has suﬃciently increased after
about 10 years. The R2 is still a respectable 50%, even though it is now driven by
both debt ratio variables, not just the inert ratio.
An interesting thought experiment is to ask how much explanatory power can be
attributed to returns alone, without any prior knowledge of a ﬁrm’s debt ratio. That
is, even a ﬁrm with zero debt some years ago would be presumed to have started
with roughly a 40% debt ratio (the sample average),6 and a negative return would
thus incorrectly predict an even higher debt ratio next year—although this would
now no longer be the appropriate mechanistic ratio implication (which would still
be zero). (Naturally, representing lagged debt ratios alone, ADR is now likely to pick
up some power due to managerial nonaction.)
Consequently, we repeated a regressions which considers how well raw returns
alone, without even any aid of the companies previous capital structure, can predict
capital structure. In a regression similar to that in Table 10, but with IDR replaced
with the handicapped variable (using the unconditional debt ratio as the starting
value for all ﬁrms), over a 5-year horizon, IDR still retains a coeﬃcient of above 60%
6Naturally, a regression using industry averages as starting points would do even better pre-
dicting future capital structure than the unconditional aggregate sample averages.
21on all horizons. However, now ADR gains some of the power previously allowed to
be allocated to either ADR or IDR. Thus, ADR obtains coeﬃcients of about 90% on
the 1-year horizon and 70% to 75% on the 5-year horizon.
V The Inﬂuence of Other Variables
Insert Table 11 Here:
The Inﬂuence Of Third Variables
Table 11 examines the role of other corporate reasons that may inﬂuence capital
structure, above and beyond the mechanistic inﬂuence of ﬁrms’ stock returns.
Panel A examines whether taxes induce ﬁrms to lever up. The answer is yes.
Graham’s simulated tax variables perform quite well and are statistically signiﬁcant.
A more naive tax/earnings rate is less signiﬁcant. A tax/asset ratio (results not
reported) is insigniﬁcant.
Panel B explores whether proﬁtability or growth induce a ﬁrm to adjust its debt
ratio. In sum, we ﬁnd no important inﬂuence of proﬁtability or growth on debt
ratios. We also tried earnings over sales, as well as changes in all ratios. None had
any important inﬂuence on debt ratios. It appears as if previous papers’ ﬁndings
of signiﬁcance of earnings are primarily due to their correlation with stock returns.
Firms with positive earnings are likely to also have experienced positive returns,
which in turn mechanistically lower their debt ratios. Similarly, the book/market
ratio of equity, an important variable in other studies, has no explanatory power
above and beyond the mechanistic inﬂuence of returns on capital ratios.
Panel C explores uniqueness Titman and Wessels (1988). Again, there is no eco-
nomic signiﬁcance here, even though there may be marginal statistical signiﬁcance
for the F-M RD0/SLS0 variable. (We also tried changes in uniqueness, and restricting
our data set to even larger ﬁrms, only. Neither resulted in signiﬁcance.)
Panel D explores the role of own volatility, both pure equity and implied ﬁrm
volatility. The regressions indicate that ﬁrms experiencing high equity volatilities
22lower their debt ratios. Although this inﬂuence does not moderate the importance
of inertia, it does hint that ﬁrms may not readjust towards their previous debt ratios,
but towards debt ratios conservative enough to be “in line” with their experienced
volatilities.
Panel E explores a behavioral hypothesis: that ﬁrms are inclined to adjust their
capital structure towards that of their industry. Thus, our variable is the diﬀerence
between the ﬁrm’s own lagged debt ratio and the industry’s lagged debt ratio. The
negative coeﬃcients on the IARD0 variables imply that ﬁrms are indeed inclined
to correct towards their industries’ debt ratios. The coeﬃcients are always highly
statistically signiﬁcant, and in terms of importance at least the equals of the tax
ratio coeﬃcients.
Thus we conclude that if there are any variables that induce ﬁrms to change
their capital structure, above and beyond what is caused by mechanistic changes
in ﬁrms’ stock returns, they are ﬁrst the capital structure in ﬁrms’ peer industries
and ﬁrms’ own equity volatilities, followed by ﬁrms’ own tax rates (with higher
tax rates producing higher leverage).7 Other variables popular in the literature—
speciﬁcally uniqueness measures, proﬁtability ratios, and book/market values—
seem to function only through their mechanistic correlation with (past) returns and
equity capitalization. Once we include our mechanistic inertia debt ratio, these
variables lose their power.
7Not reported in the tables: When measured simultaneously instead of lagged, tax rate vari-
ables do not perform better. Other variables perform better or as well. Simultaneous proﬁtability
variables do slightly better. RD0/SLS0 has a coeﬃcient of –3.7 when it is simultanous and retains
its reported standard deviation. Industry debt ratios perform about as well.
23VI Related Literature
As far as we know, no study has entertained the use of stock returns to directly
compute the resulting capital structure. It is the singularly best variable describing
capital structure, and permits a quantitative and not just a qualitative test of inertia.
The most prominent study of capital structure may well be Titman and Wessels
(1988). They predict debt (long-term, short-term, and convertible debt) divided ei-
ther by the market-value of equity or by the book value of debt. (Not surprisingly,
some of their results are sensitive to this deﬁnition.) Most of the factors they exam-
ined did not seem particularly robust even in their own study. Only “uniqueness”
(measured by R&D/sales, high selling expenses, and employees with low quit rates)
is consistently negative, with T-statistics of around –2 to –3. When they use the
market value of equity, proﬁtability (operating income) matters. As pointed out, we
believe that this was a mechanistic relation because proﬁtability is correlated with
stock return performance.
Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) use option pricing theory to explore the
role of transaction costs. They ﬁnd that even small recapitalization costs lead to
wide swings in debt ratios. The study is not immediately comparable, because their
empirical section predicts capital structure ranges, not capital structure itself.
Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995) ﬁnd that debt ratios are negatively related
to market/book ratios, but—like much of the literature—interpret this to reﬂect
growth opportunities which cause underinvestment concerns due to bankruptcy
risk. Although it is possible that ﬁrms are inert because they do not have to respond
(because these bankruptcy costs increase magically in the correct proportion), the
fact that we observe similar coeﬃcient values among large ﬁrms with low leverage
(who are unlikely to go bankrupt), renders this perspective less plausible than the
simpler alternative of inertia. In addition, we ﬁnd that book/market values disap-
pear as an important predictor once the mechanistic inﬂuence of stock returns on
debt ratios is accounted for.
24Rajan and Zingales (1995) oﬀer the deﬁnite description of OECD capital structure
in light of well-known theories. They, too, ﬁnd a strong negative correlation between
market-book ratios and leverage—but also consider this to be evidence of a pro-
active choice.8
Graham has produced a series of inﬂuential papers on the tax aspects of capital
structure. In Graham (2000), he laments that especially large ﬁrms seem to fail
taking advantage of the tax shelter provided by debt. Our own paper merely points
out that this is a symptom from some underlying cause of inertia: ﬁrms capital
structure is not driven by active considerations (tax or otherwise), but by external
market values. As ﬁrms become larger and larger, they continue to fail even in
returning to, much less in updating their debt ratio to where it should be. Graham,
Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998) use an almost identical dependent variable as we
do (except they add operating leases to the denominator). But they focus on tax
rates, and thus do not include our inertia variable as a control.9
There is also a large literature on what determines the issuing activity of cor-
porations. This is a very interesting topic in itself. However, as our paper shows,
it is not that issuing activity is interesting because it is of prime importance as a
determinant of capital structure. Issuing activity could potentially be such a de-
terminant, but empirically it is not. Still, the theoretical hypothesized inﬂuences
for issuing activity are the same as for capital structure, and thus such studies are
related to our own. Further, a skeptic could take the view that knowledge that ﬁrms
issue and change retained earnings and dividends rarely, together with the fact that
equity returns are volatile, is equivalent to our own ﬁndings—and indeed it is. It is
just that noone has put the two together in trying to explain capital structure levels
as-of-yet.
8Because Japan has an insigniﬁcant market-book coeﬃcient, it would be interesting to see if
these ﬁrms are similarly inert. In addition, our ﬁnding that market-book ratios function only
insofar as they are picking up mechanistic changes in equity value applies only to U.S. data. It
would be interesting to ﬁnd out whether this is also the case in their international sample.
9Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998) do mention transaction costs as a reason for the
signiﬁcance of a market-book ratio variable. Thanks to John Graham’s generous provision of his
simulated tax rate data, we were able to conﬁrm his ﬁndings.
25Our evidence is also in line with the survey evidence presented in Graham and
Harvey (2001): queried executives apparently care little about most theories of op-
timal capital structure. To the extent that they do care when actively issuing, man-
agers claim it is about ﬁnancial ﬂexibility and credit ratings for debt issues; and
about earnings dilution and past stock price appreciation for equity issues. On the
other hand, executives claim that they issue equity to maintain a target debt-equity
ratio, especially if their ﬁrm is highly levered. We ﬁnd little evidence thereto. Gra-
ham and Harvey (2001) even imply our inertia hypothesis, asking executives for
the importance of rebalancing when their equity value changes—and ﬁnd that ex-
ecutives attach no importance thereto. Managers also do not claim to be much
concerned with transaction costs.
Baker and Wurgler (2002), Havakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) and Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) are the closest relatives of our paper. The ﬁrst is interested
primarily in the role of stock returns on inducing issuing activity, while the latter
are interested in the readjustment towards an optimal capital ratio.
Baker and Wurgler (2002) also investigates the inﬂuence of past market returns.
However, their point is to argue that past market returns inﬂuence the active ﬁ-
nancing decisions of ﬁrms. This means that they do not explore the direct role of
the past stock returns themselves (just their induced ﬁnancing choices) in what de-
termines ﬁrms’ capital structures. Our paper is not rejecting their view point. On
the contrary, we believe that ﬁrms may be acting just as Baker and Wurgler (2002)
suggest. Our point is merely that ﬁrms’ proactive behavior is merely the second-
order eﬀect. Indeed, if the Baker and Wurgler (2002) eﬀect had been of primary
importance in the set of ﬁrms in our study, we should have seen IDR coeﬃcients
signiﬁcantly above 1 (and negative ADR coeﬃcients). But, the data do not suggest a
signiﬁcant tendency of ﬁrms to “overshoot.”10;11
10As already mentioned, the active timing hypothesis is also the primary “theory” not predicting
a constant or increasing debt ratio as ﬁrm value increases. Although this theory is a more diﬃcult
test, given that the mechanistic relation is so strong, even this active theory is not going to be a
ﬁrst-order determinant of capital structure levels.
11We also tested if our tests mask expansion of ﬁrms in response to increasing equity returns:
after all, they could issue both equity and debt. In the top decile of ﬁrms experiencing high stock
returns, we found some minor evidence thereto. The emphasis is on minor.
26Havakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) ﬁnd a mild tendency of ﬁrms to return
to a target debt-equity accounting ratio. But, they use only accounting ratios in
their ﬁrst-stage regressions in an attempt to establish a target debt-equity ratio. By
using a market-based value of equity rather than a debt-asset ratio based variable,
and by introducing our direct inertia debt target ratio, we ﬁnd that it subsumes al-
most all explanatory power of their variables as a determinant of economic capital
structure.12 Thus, we come to quite a diﬀerent conclusion: we believe that there
is very little capital structure adjustment. In fairness, Havakimian, Opler, and Tit-
man (2001) are more interested in what ﬁrms ultimately choose to issue when they
choose to issue. And, like Baker and Wurgler (2002), they ﬁnd that high stock re-
turns surprisingly lead ﬁrms to issue more equity, not more debt. We are more
interested with the failure to choose anything at all.13
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) are similarly interested in whether issuing activ-
ity leads to a return towards historical debt ratios (deﬁned in term of book values).
They ﬁnd little evidence that ﬁrms make proactive choices to return to their histor-
ical debt ratios.
Finally, we can think of only one paper that is similar in spirit and domain to
our own: Thaler, Michaely, and Benartzi (1997) ﬁnd that, in contrast to optimizing
theories of dividend payments, managers seem to pay dividends more in response
to past earnings than in response to an expectation of future earnings. Thus, their
actions are better explained as a non-rational behavioral status-quo bias. The ev-
idence presented in our paper is in line with a view of the CFO acting less in line
with value optimization and more in line with the status quo.
12Their Table 3 regressions report OLS R2 of about 0.4. Our debt ratio would probably not
assume all power if we used accounting capital structure. Then, again, it is not clear what the
accounting debt/asset ratio really means, as described in Section II.A.
13Fama and French (1998) does not predict equity ratios, but ﬁrm value. (or ﬁrm value minus
assets) instead.
27VII Conclusion
This paper has introduced a variable measuring inertia, which allowed us to explore
its magnitude, explanatory power, and longevity, rather than just its directional in-
ﬂuence. In the capital structure context, inert behavior leads to debt ratios whip-
sawed by external stock returns. We found that ﬁrms showed little inclination to
try to counteract the whipsawing in order to return to an optimal (i.e., previously
chosen) debt ratio. The inertia eﬀects are orders of magnitude greater than any
activist choices or any third variables proposed in the literature. Thus, we conclude
that ﬁrms’ capital structures reﬂect less a deliberate (tax-bankruptcy or timing) op-
timization policy than a primarily inert structure.
Observed corporate capital structure is primarily driven by external stock
returns, and not by managerial responses thereto (or to any other factors).
Capital structure is what it is simply because managers do not adjust their capital
structures in response to stock returns, which naturally typically accrue to and thus
increase ﬁrms’ equity values in the absence of rebalancing action.
Consequently, to predict capital structure, “all” one needs to do is to predict
future raw returns. Or, put diﬀerently, if a corporate theorist wanted to use internal
corporate data to predict a ﬁrm’s capital structure, he must ﬁrst and foremost be
able to predict the ﬁrm’s stock return with these variables.
In contrast to inertia, most theories of capital structure optimization, which
trade oﬀ the default disadvantage against any advantage of debt, stand no chance.
In most such theories, growth (an increase in the ﬁrm’s equity or enterprise value)
should not induce a decrease but an increase in the ﬁrm’s leverage ratio. Such
theories of optimization are normative, but not descriptive: observed capital struc-
ture choice is inert to the point that we can usually detect practically no movement
towards such a more optimal capital structure in response to ﬁrm value changes.
Perhaps this is also why the average ﬁnance curriculum spends more time on opti-
mal theories than on describing the actual capital structure evidence.
28Even though the viewpoint taken in this paper is rather radical, we doubt that,
once put forward, the argument comes as a big surprise. In the end, we hope that
this paper can justify its title: it oﬀers a simple description for the main empirical
determinant of capital structure, an issue that researchers have hitherto struggled
with. (We still do not know why companies are so inert, of course.) In any case, our
paper has focused on the ﬁrst-order determinant of observed capital structure in a
more direct fashion than any prior literature.
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A Does A Book-Based Accounting Ratio Proxy For a Market-
Based Accounting Ratio?
Method Variable con. IDR0;1 ADR0 Var c IDR ADR Var N R2
F-M Equity Book Value 2.0 93.6 –2.9 7.4 0.3 4.3 4.2 2.2 25 91.2
Pooled Equity Book Value 2.8 98.9 –2.2 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.1 45,494 90.4
Explanation: For a basic description, see Table 6. The debt ratio based on the book value of equity is now
the third variable, and it is contemporaneous with the debt ratio based on market value.
Interpretation: A book-value related debt ratio has no meaning as far as a market-value debt ratio is con-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Table 6. Year By Year Base Regressions
year con. IDR0;1 ADR0 c IDR ADR R2 N
1976 1.6 104.1 –4.3 0.3 4.5 4.2 95.7 804
1977 3.0 98.2 –0.4 0.3 6.1 5.9 93.5 1,292
1978 3.9 99.9 –1.9 0.3 5.1 5.2 92.2 1,414
1979 3.8 106.6 –7.7 0.3 3.9 3.9 93.2 1,498
1980 2.7 103.3 –5.1 0.3 3.1 3.2 93.6 1,535
1981 2.7 100.7 –2.3 0.3 3.0 3.0 93.2 1,511
1982 2.9 105.4 –8.6 0.3 3.2 2.9 92.0 1,580
1983 1.4 100.9 –4.3 0.3 3.5 3.3 91.0 1,652
1984 3.4 97.9 –2.6 0.3 4.9 4.7 88.0 1,763
1985 3.2 83.2 11.9 0.3 4.2 3.7 88.4 1,786
1986 4.0 86.0 7.3 0.3 4.3 4.2 84.3 1,839
1987 3.7 99.8 –6.0 0.3 4.2 4.5 86.3 1,844
1988 4.0 78.9 15.7 0.3 7.0 6.4 85.0 1,855
1989 3.4 99.2 –2.7 0.3 3.7 3.7 88.3 2,006
1990 3.0 92.3 3.8 0.3 4.5 4.8 91.0 2,010
1991 1.8 98.9 –2.9 0.3 7.0 6.5 92.2 1,932
1992 1.7 108.3 –12.2 0.2 3.5 3.5 91.6 2,018
1993 1.6 96.4 –0.2 0.2 5.6 5.3 92.0 2,204
1994 2.4 95.4 1.8 0.2 4.3 4.3 91.1 2,642
1995 2.9 102.5 –6.4 0.2 3.6 3.4 89.3 2,925
1996 2.3 89.9 7.1 0.2 4.7 4.4 89.9 3,124
1997 2.7 90.9 6.2 0.2 3.1 2.9 89.3 3,186
1998 3.7 99.4 –2.3 0.2 3.4 3.5 88.1 3,288
1999 3.2 108.0 –10.5 0.2 2.1 2.3 91.3 2,977
2000 2.4 96.6 0.8 0.2 2.3 2.3 91.4 2,679
F-M 2.9 97.7 –1.0 0.3 4.2 4.1 90.5 25
Pooled 2.8 98.9 –2.1 0.1 0.8 0.8 90.4 51,364
Panel B: December Firms Only
year con. IDR0;1 ADR0 c IDR ADR R2 N
F-M 3.0 96.6 0.0 0.3 5.2 5.1 91.0 33,709
Pooled 3.0 98.4 –1.6 0.1 0.9 0.9 90.8 33,709
Explanation: The sample are the 1975–2000 Compustat tapes, excluding tiny ﬁrms (see Page B).
The table presents the results of annual cross-sectional regressions predicting ﬁrms’ debt ratios
(debt divided by debt plus the market value of equity) with the “inert” debt ratio IDR (where the
lagged market value of equity is grossed up by the raw total stock return over the year) and the
ﬁrm’s own lagged debt ratio ADR. If ﬁrms follow an optimizing process in which higher ﬁrm
value should induce higher debt ratios, the coeﬃcient on ADR should be 100 (percent). If ﬁrms are
entirely inert, which means that their debt ratio is driven mechanistically by stock returns, then the
coeﬃcient on IDR should be 100 (percent). Fama-MacBeth statistics (F-M) report column averages.
Pooled Regressions (Pooled) simply use all observations, regardless of year, in one regression. All
standard deviations are heteroskedasticity adjusted.
Interpretation: Firms are practically inert. They show no tendency to return to their prior debt
ratios in response to changing ﬁrm values. 36Table 7. Pooled Regressions Categorized By Third Variables
Panel A: By Assets0: Lagged Assets
Assets0 con. IDR0;1 ADR0 c IDR ADR R2 N
small 1 2.2 95.1 1.8 0.1 2.5 2.4 73.3 10,262
2 3.0 101.4 –5.9 0.1 1.5 1.5 85.3 10,273
3 3.5 99.8 –5.4 0.1 1.7 1.6 88.1 10,274
4 3.5 100.0 –4.3 0.1 1.5 1.5 89.5 10,273
large 5 3.5 98.0 –1.4 0.1 1.6 1.6 93.4 10,282
Panel B: By MCAP0/SP5000: Lagged(!) Equity Cap Divided by S&P500
MCAP0/SP5000 con. IDR0;1 ADR0 c IDR ADR R2 N
small 1 3.0 95.7 –0.8 0.1 1.5 1.5 88.2 10,272
2 2.9 99.5 –4.0 0.1 1.6 1.5 89.2 10,273
3 2.8 99.3 –1.9 0.1 2.1 2.0 91.3 10,273
4 2.7 101.4 –3.3 0.1 1.5 1.5 92.1 10,273
large 5 2.5 102.5 –3.7 0.1 1.8 1.8 92.3 10,273
Panel C: By OI0/SLS0: Proﬁtability (Operating Income Divided By Sales)
OI0/SLS0 con. IDR0;1 ADR0 c IDR ADR R2 N
unprftbl. 1 3.0 93.9 –0.2 0.1 1.8 1.7 86.5 10,272
2 3.1 102.9 –7.4 0.1 1.3 1.3 89.4 10,273
3 3.0 104.4 –7.6 0.1 1.5 1.6 90.6 10,273
4 2.4 100.1 –1.5 0.1 1.7 1.7 92.8 10,273
prftbl. 5 3.1 98.3 –0.3 0.1 1.9 1.8 91.9 10,273
Panel D: By TAX0/(EARN0+TAX0): Tax Rate (Taxes Divided by Earnings Plus Taxes)
TAXRATEG
0 con. IDR0;1 ADR0 c IDR ADR R2 N
low-tax 1 2.4 92.8 3.1 0.1 1.8 1.7 90.3 10,272
2 2.9 101.7 –4.0 0.1 1.4 1.4 91.6 10,273
3 2.8 100.8 –3.2 0.1 1.7 1.6 89.7 10,273
4 2.9 104.1 –6.6 0.1 1.7 1.7 89.6 10,273
high-tax 5 3.1 100.7 –4.6 0.1 1.5 1.5 90.1 10,273
37(Table 7 continued)
Panel E: By BVE0/MVE0: Value vs Growth
BVE0/MVE0 con. IDR0;1 ADR0 c IDR ADR R2 N
growth 1 1.9 100.0 –3.8 0.1 2.0 2.0 88.1 10,272
2 2.7 102.1 –4.3 0.1 2.2 2.2 84.6 10,273
3 3.5 99.0 –2.9 0.1 1.6 1.6 85.9 10,273
4 3.8 96.8 –1.7 0.2 1.7 1.6 87.0 10,273
value 5 3.9 100.3 –5.2 0.2 1.8 1.8 90.1 10,273
Panel F: By RISKY0: Credit Rating
Credit Rating con. IDR0;1 ADR0 c IDR ADR R2 N
Investment Grade (– BBB) 3.8 99.7 –7.7 0.4 1.8 1.8 85.5 3,344
Non-Investment Grade (BB+ –) 3.3 100.3 –3.5 0.1 1.9 1.9 92.3 8,479
Panel G: By EVOL 1;0: Asset-Adjusted Equity Volatility
EVOL 1;0 con. IDR0;1 ADR0 c IDR ADR R2 N
low volatility 1 2.5 97.6 0.9 0.1 2.2 2.1 91.5 10,273
2 2.7 100.3 -2.5 0.1 1.8 1.8 90.5 10,273
3 2.9 98.6 -1.9 0.1 2.1 2.0 89.8 10,273
4 2.9 99.8 -3.4 0.1 1.7 1.7 90.4 10,273
high volatility 5 3.0 99.3 -4.1 0.1 1.3 1.3 90.1 10,272
Panel H: By FVOL 1;0: Asset-Adjusted Firm Volatility
BVE0/MVE0 con. IDR0;1 ADR0 c IDR ADR R2 N
low volatility 1 2.7 94.5 2.0 0.1 2.0 1.9 92.7 10,273
2 2.7 97.1 –0.2 0.1 1.5 1.5 90.7 10,273
3 2.7 100.7 –3.3 0.1 2.0 2.0 88.3 10,273
4 2.7 98.9 –1.4 0.1 1.6 1.6 84.8 10,273
high volatility 5 3.0 102.5 –5.2 0.1 1.7 1.7 77.3 10,272
Explanation: For a description, see Table 6. This table diﬀers in that it reports pooled regression
results by subcategories, based on ﬁrm-year observations one year prior. Asset-adjusted denotes
a sort ﬁrst by size and then into bins based on volatility.
Interpretation: Low-tax, smaller ﬁrms show a mildly lesser tendency to actively deviate from their
inert implied debt ratio. However, even these ﬁrms fail to show a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient
on their own lagged debt ratio. Higher volatility ﬁrms (but not higher equity volatility ﬁrms) show
a mildly higher tendency to remain inert.
38Table 8. By Current and Future Net Returns
Panel A: F-M Regressions
Current Returns
Lowest Low Medium High Highest
Lowest 101.0 94.6 91.0 96.6 98.7
–9.1 –3.0 5.2 –3.1 –5.2
Low 84.6 119.2 105.1 85.1 107.5
9.0 –22.8 –8.8 10.8 –12.8
Medium 121.8 94.2 96.3 110.2 97.9
–24.8 3.8 1.2 –12.8 –2.7
High 66.5 69.9 77.8 82.6 110.2














Highest 98.3 99.3 95.1 101.1 100.8
–2.1 –1.7 2.2 –3.9 –3.3
Panel B: Pooled Regressions
Current Returns
Lowest Low Medium High Highest
Lowest 98.8 97.1 91.3 96.6 95.1
–5.9 –3.6 4.3 –2.1 –1.3
Low 113.7 124.8 121.8 109.9 103.3
–17.5 –27.5 –24.2 –13.0 –7.4
Medium 109.3 123.7 120.8 109.7 102.0
–11.0 –24.2 –21.7 –11.4 –5.7
High 82.5 99.6 96.9 91.2 95.1














Highest 101.3 97.4 98.9 101.3 98.3
–3.6 0.3 –0.7 –3.6 –0.5
Explanation: For a description of the underlying regressions, see Table 6. The classiﬁcation is
based on the current net return (timed the same as the raw return used to compute IDR), and on
the subsequent year’s net return. The top number in each cell reports the coeﬃcient on IDR0;1,
the bottom number in each cell reports the coeﬃcient on ADR0. The number of observations in a
cell ranges from 1,337 to 2,704. The constant, standard errors, and r-square are not reported due
to lack of space.
Interpretation: The table shows that ﬁrms that experience subsequent reversals (top right, bottom
left) are not economically signiﬁcantly more inert.
39Table 9. Alternative Debt Deﬁnitions
Benchmark Case: Long-Term Debt and Debt in Current Liabilities (ADR)
Method con. IDR0;1 ADR0 c IDR ADR R2 N
F-M 2.9 97.7 –1.0 0.3 4.2 4.1 90.5 25
Pooled 2.8 98.9 –2.1 0.1 0.8 0.8 90.4 51,364
Adding Accounts Payables (ADR+ACCT )
Method con. IDR0;1 ADR0 c IDR ADR R2 N
F-M 3.0 95.8 1.2 0.3 3.3 3.3 93.9 25
Pooled 2.9 97.0 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.6 90.5 51,357
Long-Term Debt Only (ADRLT)
Method con. IDR0;1 ADR0 c IDR ADR R2 N
F-M 2.6 90.8 4.8 0.3 5.5 5.2 87.5 25
Pooled 2.6 92.6 3.2 0.0 1.1 1.0 87.4 51,364
Convertible Debt Only (ADRCV)
Method con. IDR0;1 ADR0 c IDR ADR R2 N
F-M 0.4 83.0 7.4 0.1 17.8 16.7 75.8 25
Pooled 0.4 84.4 5.6 0.0 3.6 3.4 76.1 45,832
Short-Term Debt Only (ADRST)
Method con. IDR0;1 ADR0 c IDR ADR R2 N
F-M 1.4 97.4 –2.7 0.2 11.9 11.3 82.9 25
Pooled 1.4 94.7 –0.2 0.0 2.3 2.1 82.7 51,364
Explanation: For a description, see Table 6. This table diﬀers in that it uses diﬀerent deﬁnitions
of debt.
Interpretation: Because the value of convertible debt covaries with the value of equity, and because
we do not have market valuations for convertible debt, this table can only serve as a check for the
quality of the regressions. We should see lagged implied debt ratios (IDR) have lesser inﬂuence on
the ratio of convertible debt divided by convertible debt plus the market value of equity. Indeed,
this is borne out by these regressions.
40Table 10. The Longevity of Inertia
/ And the External Determination of Capital Structure
Non-Overlapping Regressions
Method con. IDRt a;t ADRt a c IDR ADR R2 N
1-Year F-M 2.9 97.7 –1.0 0.3 4.2 4.1 90.5 25
2-Year F-M 5.5 96.3 –2.9 0.4 4.2 3.9 81.8 12
3-Year F-M 7.0 87.1 4.6 0.4 4.3 3.9 76.1 8
4-Year F-M 8.6 86.0 4.0 0.5 4.1 3.6 70.4 6
5-Year F-M 9.6 84.1 6.7 0.6 4.0 3.6 68.6 5
10-Year F-M 13.5 63.7 22.1 0.9 4.7 3.3 52.1 2
1-Year Pooled 2.8 98.9 –2.1 0.1 0.8 0.8 90.4 51,364
2-Year Pooled 5.4 97.7 –4.1 0.1 1.1 1.0 81.8 23,328
3-Year Pooled 6.9 90.4 1.9 0.2 1.4 1.2 76.0 14,330
4-Year Pooled 8.5 88.3 2.1 0.2 1.7 1.5 69.8 9,811
5-Year Pooled 9.8 85.2 4.4 0.3 1.8 1.5 66.5 7,170
10-Year Pooled 13.4 63.5 22.1 0.6 3.3 2.4 51.8 2,167
Overlapping Regressions
Method con. IDRt a;t ADRt a c IDR ADR R2 N
1-Year F-M 2.9 97.7 –1.0 0.3 4.2 4.1 90.5 25
2-Year F-M 5.3 95.7 –1.9 0.4 4.0 3.8 82.4 24
3-Year F-M 7.2 90.1 1.5 0.5 4.2 3.8 75.7 23
4-Year F-M 8.4 84.0 5.8 0.5 4.3 3.7 70.5 22
5-Year F-M 9.3 77.8 10.4 0.6 4.6 3.7 65.7 21
10-Year F-M 11.8 50.0 28.4 0.8 6.0 3.7 46.9 20
1-Year Pooled 2.8 98.9 –2.1 0.1 0.8 0.8 90.4 51,364
2-Year Pooled 5.3 97.1 –3.1 0.1 0.8 0.7 82.2 45,494
3-Year Pooled 7.1 91.6 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.8 75.2 40,269
4-Year Pooled 8.3 84.6 5.2 0.1 0.9 0.8 69.6 35,684
5-Year Pooled 9.2 77.6 10.2 0.1 1.0 0.8 64.5 31,768
10-Year Pooled 11.4 48.3 29.6 0.2 1.5 0.9 46.7 17,850
Explanation: For a basic description, see Table 6. This table diﬀers in that it predicts debt ratio
using debt ratios lagged by a years. Thus IDRt a;t uses a year raw stock returns to gross up the a
year lagged debt ratio in a mechanistic fashion (determined by stock price movements).
Interpretation: IDRt a;t continues to dominate lagged debt ratios even after ﬁve years. However
after about four years, companies begin to try to somewhat correct some of their capital structure
back to a prior ratio (not determined purely by the stock market change). Still, the coeﬃcient of
ADR is far below that of IDR. Moreover, it is outright remarkable that 65% to 70% of the variation
in capital structure after 5 years can still be explained primarily by non-action.
41Table 11. The Inﬂuence Of Third Variables
Panel A: Tax Variables
Method Variable con. IDR0;1 ADR0 Var c IDR ADR Var N R2
F-M TAXRATEG
0 A 1.3 99.7 –2.9 4.2 0.5 4.3 4.2 1.3 25 90.0
F-M TAXRATEG
0B 0.3 99.4 –3.2 6.7 0.9 4.3 4.2 2.4 25 89.9
F-M TAX0/(EARN0+TAX0) 2.8 97.8 –1.1 0.3 0.4 4.2 4.1 0.7 25 90.5
F-M TAX0/TA0 3.0 97.7 –1.2 –1.9 0.4 4.2 4.1 5.3 25 90.5
Pooled TAXRATEG
0 A 1.4 102.0 –5.3 4.2 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.3 35,169 90.1
Pooled TAXRATEG
0B 0.8 101.8 –5.7 5.5 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.4 33,883 90.0
Pooled TAX0/(EARN0+TAX0) 2.7 99.0 –2.1 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.1 51,259 90.4
Pooled TAX0/TA0 2.8 99.0 –2.1 1.5 0.1 0.8 0.8 1.0 51,306 90.4
Panel B: Proﬁtability and Growth
Method Variable con. IDR0;1 ADR0 Var c IDR ADR Var N R2
F-M OI0/SLS0 2.8 97.7 –1.1 0.1 0.3 4.2 4.1 0.3 25 90.5
F-M OI0/TA0 2.9 97.7 –1.1 –0.4 0.3 4.2 4.1 0.8 25 90.5
F-M BVE0/MVE0 2.9 97.7 –1.1 0.4 0.3 4.2 4.1 1.6 25 90.5
Pooled OI0/SLS0 2.8 98.8 –2.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.0 49,990 90.4
Pooled OI0/TA0 2.8 98.8 –2.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.1 50,130 90.4
Pooled BVE0/MVE0 2.8 98.8 –2.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.2 51,352 90.4
Panel C: Uniqueness
Method Variable con. IDR0;1 ADR0 Var c IDR ADR Var N R2
F-M RD0/SLS0 2.6 100.0 –4.0 –2.8 0.3 6.4 6.2 1.1 25 89.1
F-M SLEXP0/SLS0 3.0 98.6 –2.4 –0.4 0.3 4.5 4.5 0.4 25 89.5
Pooled RD0/SLS0 2.4 100.9 –4.5 –0.0 0.1 1.3 1.2 0.0 23,936 89.4
Pooled SLEXP0/SLS0 2.9 99.4 –3.0 –0.0 0.1 0.9 0.8 0.0 40,204 89.3
42(Table 11 continued)
Panel D: Volatility
Method Variable con. IDR0;1 ADR0 Var c IDR ADR Var N R2
F-M EVOL 1;0 3.9 98.5 –2.2 –9.5 0.5 4.2 4.1 4.3 25 90.5
F-M FVOL 1;0 3.6 98.1 –2.3 –6.6 0.6 4.2 4.2 5.4 25 90.5
Pooled EVOL 1;0 4.0 99.9 –3.5 –10.4 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.7 51,364 90.4
Pooled FVOL 1;0 3.9 99.5 –3.9 –9.1 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.9 51,364 90.4
Panel E: Deviation from Industry Debt Ratio
Method Variable con. IDR0;1 ADR0 Var c IDR ADR Var N R2
F-M IARD0
2d 2-digit 0.5 98.3 5.7 –9.8 0.5 4.3 4.4 1.9 25 90.8
F-M IARD0
3d 3-digit 0.4 98.4 5.5 –10.7 0.4 4.3 4.3 1.8 25 90.8
Pooled IARD0
2d 2-digit 0.2 99.4 5.3 –10.5 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.4 45,494 90.8
Pooled IARD0
3d 3-digit 0.2 99.4 5.2 –11.2 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.4 45,494 90.9
Explanation: For a basic description, see Table 6. This table diﬀers in that it includes one ad-
ditional variable, called a “third variable.” As indicated by time subscript 0, third variables are
lagged by one year (one ﬁnancial statement).
Interpretation: Taxes: All tax variables correlate positively with debt ratio, in line with the theory.
The Graham simulated tax variable is the best predictor of debt ratio. However, tax rate is only
a mild predictor when compared with the implied debt ratio. Proﬁtability and Growth: These
variables are not robustly important. Uniqueness: unimportant as a determinant of debt ratio.
Volatility: Firms that are more volatile tend to adopt lower debt ratios. Industry: Except for IDR,
the industry debt ratio appears to be the best predictor of a ﬁrm’s debt ratio: ﬁrms seem to try to
adjust towards their industry’s debt ratio.
43